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The  demographic  transition  of  the  last  decades  has  severely  challenged  many  pension 
systems around the  World. In many countries this has brought about several reforms, whose 
ultimate effect has been to increase retirement age and to cut pension benefits. The body of 
evidence  shows  that  the  reduction  in  pension  benefits  brought  out  by  pension  reforms  has 
increased saving and private wealth accumulation, although at a rate of considerably less than 
one-for-one.  Feldstein  (1974)  and  Feldstein  and  Pellechio  (1979)  estimated  the  displacement 
effect  of  pension  wealth  on  national  saving  using  U.S.  time  series  and  microeconomic  data, 
respectively. Since then, a growing literature has used individual level data to provide evidence 
on the degree of substitution between discretionary accumulation and pension wealth in the U.S. 
and  other  countries  (Gale,  1998;  Bernheim,  2002).  A  more  recent  literature  exploits  the 
exogenous innovations induced by the pension reforms to estimate the effect of changes in social 
security wealth on private accumulation. Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) find that the reduction 
in pension wealth induced by the Italian 1992  pension reform has increased the saving rate. 
Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) obtain similar results with British data. Bottazzi, Jappelli and 
Padula  (2006)  find  that  the  Italian  1992  and  1995  pension  reforms  increased  the  household 
wealth-income ratio. 
Despite existing evidence on the extent of the offset between private and pension wealth, 
no empirical study so far has studied the portfolio effect of pension reforms on the allocation of 
wealth. To the extent that reforms affect not only how much people save but also the mix of 
assets in households’ portfolios, simply estimating the wealth effect of pension reforms might 
give a wrong impact of the long-term consequences of pension reforms. Since different wealth 
components are imperfect substitutes, the wealth reallocation that follows a pension reform can 
impact the amount of consumable wealth that individuals can spend down during retirement. 
Even if total wealth increases after a reduction in pension benefits, consumable wealth might 
increase or decrease depending on the impact of the reforms on financial assets (which are readily 
available for consumption) and real assets (which can be converted in consumption at a cost). For 
households that do not save enough for retirement, understanding which component of private   1
wealth  is  more  responsive  to  changes  in  pension  wealth  helps  also  at  designing  policies  to 
increase retirement saving. 
In the paper we relate  expected social security wealth to financial and real wealth and 
estimate the displacement effect of pension reforms on various components of private wealth, 
including risky and safe financial assets, real estate and business wealth. In trying to account for 
the displacement effect, we also investigate the effect of innovations of social security wealth on 
financial market participation in pension funds, life insurance and ownership of real and financial 
assets. 
We focus on Italy, which underwent three major pension reforms in the nineties, and use 
the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large representative survey of the Italian 
population carried out by the Bank of Italy. There are several advantages of using Italian data. 
First, the pension reforms have dramatically reduced pension benefits for young cohorts, but left 
a group of workers essentially unaffected, thus providing the exogenous variation that we exploit 
to identify the displacement effect and to instrument social security wealth. Second, the SHIW 
elicits  information  on  individual  expectations  of  retirement  age  and  replacement  rate,  which 
allows to compute a  measure of  expected social security  wealth  and to assess the degree of 
household’s awareness of pension reforms by comparing statutory with expected social security 
wealth. We are particularly interested in testing if the portfolio effect of pension reforms depends 
on the extent of information on pension matters. Third, SHIW data offer a complete picture of the 
composition of Italian households wealth, allowing us to study which wealth component has been 
mostly affected by the reforms. Finally, the data are available for a long time span, which allows 
us to focus on the long-run effect of pension reforms. To the extent that workers take time to 
understand the rules implied by the new pension regime it should be easier to detect an effect in 
the long run. 
We find that a reduction in social security wealth by the equivalent of 1 year’s income has 
been followed by an increase of 7 months’ income in real assets and an increase in safe financial 
assets of 1 month’s income. We also show that the response is stronger among households that 
are better able to estimate more accurately social security benefit. Overall, we estimate that for 
the average household the reduction in 45,000 euro of social security wealth due to the reforms 
has prompted an increase in 20,000 euro of consumable wealth.   2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the Italian pension reforms of the 
last decades and the effect of the reforms on social security wealth. Section 3 describes the trends 
in  the  two  main  wealth  components,  financial  and  real  wealth,  for  different  cohort  and 
employment groups. Since the effects of reforms differ across these groups, one might expect that 
the most affected groups also exhibit the largest financial and real wealth adjustments, which is 
indeed  what  our  findings  suggest.  In  order  to  understand  whether  this  is  due  to  how  social 
security wealth has changed after the reform, we estimate in Section 4 the displacement effect 
between social security wealth and several components of private wealth. The results highlight 
that real estate wealth has responded more than other asset categories, and that an increase in 
financial market participation accounts only for a minor component of the increase in private 
wealth. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and draws policy implications by relating them 
to the adequacy of saving debate. 
 
2. The pension reforms 
 
Until the early nineties, the Italian social security system featured high replacement rates, 
earnings-based  benefits,  indexation  of  pensions  to  real  earnings  and  cost  of  living,  generous 
provisions  for  early  retirement,  and  a  large  number  of  social  pensions  (i.e.,  old-age  income 
assistance). This resulted in the ratio of pension benefits to GDP reaching almost 16 percent in 
1991, the highest value among industrialized countries. 
The high burden of pension benefits on the state budget prompted a series of reforms 
starting from 1992. The main features of the reforms were an increase in the retirement age and 
minimum years of contributions for pension eligibility, abolition of seniority pensions for all 
those who started working after 1995, a gradual reduction in pension benefits, and indexation of 
pension benefits to prices rather than to wages. The reforms maintained the generous provisions 
of  the  pre-1992  regime  for  relatively  old  workers,  who  in  1995  had  at  least  18  years  of 
contributions,  and  different  rules  for  private  employees,  public  sector  employees  and  self-
employed.   3
Although the current regime combines some features of each of the reforms, we do not 
detail  here  their  specific  features.
1  In  fact,  we  compare  pension  regimes  and  individual 
expectations omitting the transitional years between the Amato and Prodi reforms (1992-1997).
2 
Our dataset allows us to observe workers in two regimes, one with generous provisions (before 
the Amato reform, or simply the pre-reform period) and one – ten years later - with much lower 
benefits  (after  the  Prodi  reform,  or  the  post-reform  period),  at  least  for  some  categories  of 
workers. For brevity, we refer as the complex reform process that took place in the nineties as 
“the reform.” 
 
2.1. The contribution and earnings-based pension award formula 
 
The top panel of Table 1 compares statutory retirement ages in the pre and post-reform 
regimes. For brevity we refer to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 1995 as the 
“old”, to those with less than 18 years of contributions in 1995 as the “middle aged”, and to those 
who started working after 1995 as the “young”. In the new regime the young are entitled to a 
flexible retirement age (from 57 to 65), subject to incentives. For those already working in 1995 
(the old and the middle-aged), the reform raises minimum retirement age for old age pensions of 
private sector employees (65 for men and 60 for women), but not for public employees and self-
employed. For the old and middle aged, the reform raises minimum years of contributions for 
both seniority pensions and old age pensions; for the young, whose pension award formula is 
entirely contribution based (see below) the minimum years of contributions is just 5 years. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes the pension award formula before and after the 
reform.  In  the  pre-reform  regime  social  security  benefits  were  computed  according  to  an 
earnings-based formula,  R w N ρ , where ρ, N and  R w  are, respectively, the accrual rate, the years 
of contributions and the average of the last  R  years of salary.
3 The shift to the new  regime 
                                                 
1 Brugiavini (1999) provides details of the specific features of the three Italian pension reforms, which took place in 
1992 (the Amato reform), 1995 (the Dini reform) and 1997 (the Prodi reform). 
2 Since our sample extends to 2006, we neglect a fourth pension reform which further increased retirement age 
starting in 2008. 
3 The accrual rate was 2 percent for private employees and self-employed, and ranged from 2.2 to 2.5 percent for 
public employees, depending on the years of contribution. R was 5 for private employees, 1 for public employees, 
and 10 for the self-employed.   4
dramatically altered the pension award formula for new cohorts, but retained the main features of 
the pre-reform formula for older workers. 
In the post-reform regime pensions are computed distinguishing between three cases: an 
earnings model for the old, a contribution model for the young, and a pro-rata model for the 
middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995). In each case, different rules apply to 
public employees, private employees and self-employed. 
For older workers, pensions are still computed using the earnings model, and are the sum 
of  two  components.  The  first  component  is R w 92 ρα ,  where  92 α   is  the  number  of  years  of 
contributions at the end of 1992. The second component reflects a gradual increase of R to 10 for 
private and public employees and to 15 for the self-employed.
4 In practice, for realistic earnings 
growth rates, the second component has a small impact on the final pension with respect to the 
pre-reform regime. 
For  young  workers  benefits  are  computed  according  to  a  contribution  model, 
∑ + − − − 1
0
1 ) 1 ( N t N
t g w γτ , where τ is the contribution rate and g a 5-year moving average of the 
GDP growth rate. Contributions are proportional to earnings, capitalized on the basis of a 5-year 
moving average, and then transformed in flow benefits using a coefficient (γ), set by legislators, 
that depends on retirement age and life expectancy.
5 Since the contribution rate τ is 33 percent for 
private and public employees and 20 percent for the self-employed, in the new regime the self-
employed  will  receive  substantially  lower  pensions  than  employees.  The  contributions-based 
model has identical minimum retirement age for males and females, in both old age and seniority 
pensions. However, the new regime applies only to the young cohorts, who entered the labor 
market after 1995, and will presumably start to retire after the year 2030. 
                                                 
4 Namely, for years of contributions between 1992 and 1995, R is increased by 1; for years of contributions between 
1995 and the year of retirement, R is increased by the minimum of 5 and 2/3 of the years of contributions between 
1995 and the year of retirement. For instance, for those retiring in 2000 R is increased by 3; for those retiring in 2005 
it is increased by 5. The second component is therefore ' ' 95 ' 92 95 ) ( ) ( R R w N w α ρ α α ρ − + − , where α95 is years of 
contribution at the end of 1995,  1 ' + = R R  and  ))] ( ) 3 / 2 int((   , 5 min[ ' ' 95 α − × + = N R R . Therefore, the pension for 
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5 Currently, γ ranges from 4.720 percent for somebody retiring at 57 to 6.136 percent for somebody retiring at 65.   5
Finally, for the middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995), pensions are 
computed according to a “pro-rata model”: earnings-related for working years before 1995, and 
contributions-related afterwards. 
 
2.2. The estimate of social security wealth 
 
We derive the estimate of the ratio between social security wealth and disposable income 
from individual expectations of retirement age and replacement rate; see Appendix for details of 
the computation. For this, we exploit the Survey of Households Income and Wealth, which elicits 
the expected retirement and replacement rate through the following two questions. 
 
•  When do you expect to retire? 
 
•  Think about when you will retire, and consider only the public pension (that is, exclude 
private pensions, if you have one). At the time of retirement, what fraction of labor income 
will your public pension be? 
 
These questions are available in 1989-91 (three years before the first pension reform) as 
well as in 2004-06 (six years after the third reform). We focus on the group aged 20 to 50, 
including in our sample individuals born between 1939 (who were 50 years old in 1989) and 
1986 (20 years old in 2006). The composition of the sample of older workers is likely to reflect 
self-selection into higher expected retirement ages, and so these workers are dropped from the 
analysis. A small number of individuals younger than 20 are also excluded (less than 1 percent of 
the sample). We focus on how expectations change after the reform and therefore drop workers 
that are interviewed in the transitional years (1992-2002). We define as the pre-reform period the 
pooled  1989-91  sample,  and  as  post-reform  period  the  pooled  2004-06  sample.  Finally,  we 
consider only workers who are employed or self-employed in the survey  year, excluding the 
unemployed, retirees and other individuals not in the labor force. Overall, we compute social 
security wealth for 17,628 individuals observed between 1989 and 2006.  
Table 2 reports the expected and the statutory social security wealth for male workers in 
three occupational groups (private and public employees and self-employed). In general there is a 
good  match  between  expected  and  statutory  rates.  The reduction  in  pension wealth  after  the   6
reforms is more pronounced for middle-aged public employees and self-employed; old private 
employees are virtually  unaffected in that the statutory social security wealth is very similar 
before and after the reform. While the young were not in the labor market before the reform and 
therefore no direct comparison can be made for them, one should notice that after the reform the 
statutory social security wealth is quite low for this group. 
Using the same data, we can also define the expectation error as the absolute value of the 
difference between the statutory and the expected social security wealth to disposable income 
ratio.    We then  plot  in Figure  1 the  cross-sectional  distribution of  the absolute value of  the 
expectation error before and after the reform. Even though on average expected social security 
wealth is close to statutory wealth, the expectation error of the social security wealth-income ratio 
is sizeable: the average is 1.57 before the reform and 1.41 in the post-reform period. This implies 
that for about half of the sample expected social security wealth exceeds (in absolute value) 
statutory wealth by about 18 percent, and for 25 percent of the sample by 23 percent. Since the 
response  of  changes  in  pension  wealth  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  people  are  able  to 
understand the rules of the social security system, in the empirical analysis we find it useful to 
split the sample between “Informed” households (the expectation error is below the median) and 
“Uninformed”  households  (the  expectation  error  is  above  the  median)  and  to  check  for  the 
stability of the coefficients in the two groups. 
 
2.3. Pension reform and the allocation of retirement saving 
 
In a standard life-cycle framework, households compensate a reduction in social security 
wealth by saving more in order to keep their consumption unchanged during retirement. In a 
complete markets world, it would not matter what specific asset households buy to compensate 
the reduction in social security wealth: all assets have the same risk-adjusted return. However, to 
the extent that households are borrowing (and short-sale) constrained, face uninsurable risks and 
transaction costs, the effects of reducing future social security benefits might differ according to 
the particular asset bought by the households. 
The Italian pension reforms have reduced replacement rates and social security wealth at 
retirement  which,  according  to  the  life-cycle  model,  requires  households  to  increase  their   7
discretionary  saving  for  retirement.  To  illustrate  the  effects  of  pension  wealth  on  portfolio 
allocation, suppose that households can invest their wealth in safe and risky asset. If preference 
exhibit constant relative risk aversion preferences (CRRA), changes in social security wealth 
should not affect portfolio rules (see Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969)). If one adds labor 
income, the portfolio rule changes with age, even if income is not uncertain (Merton, 1971). The 
analysis is more complicated if income risk is not insurable and households face borrowing (and 
short sale) constraints. In this case, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) show that portfolio rules 
become a function of age and wealth even in a CRRA framework. Thus, cuts in pension benefits 
have the potential to alter also the portfolio allocation rule. How the rule changes depends on the 
age at which the reduction of social security wealth is announced (or perceived) and on the shape 
of the age-income profile. This happens because the share of wealth invested in the risky asset is 
lower for households close to retirement, and decreases with wealth at a rate that varies non-
monotonically with age. 
To understand the possible effects of pension reforms on portfolio choices, one should 
also take into account that individuals invest in housing a substantial fraction of their wealth. 
Housing price risk might crowd out stockownership (Cocco, 2005) but also serve as a hedge 
against rent risk (Sinai and Souleles, 2005). Therefore, if the increase in private wealth brought 
about by the reform triggers an increase in housing wealth, the share of wealth invested in risky 
assets, such as stocks, might decrease or increase depending on whether the crowd out or the 
hedge effects dominate. On the other hand, if housing wealth is not annuitizable, households 
might not choose to increase the share of wealth invested in housing after a pension reform. 
Transaction costs might have a similar effect and discourage households from investing in the 
housing market. 
So  far  we  have  assumed  that  the pension  reforms simply  reduced the  level of  social 
security wealth at retirement. This is not, however, the only effect of pension reforms, which 
might also affect the risk of future benefits. This effect is potentially important, because social 
security contributions are mandatory and pension risk is not avoidable: in this sense, wealth is 
like human capital, and its risk plays the role of a background risk. To the extent that reforms 
have reduced the risk associated with social security wealth, one might see households investing 
a larger share of their wealth in risky assets.   8
Whether or not the Italian reforms have reduced the riskiness of social security wealth is 
open to discussion. Pension reforms have increased the solvency of the system, and therefore 
reduced the risk of future defaults. Moreover, in the new contribution model pension benefits 
depend on the entire life-time earnings profile; depending on the timing of income shocks, this 
can  reduce  the  risk  of  future  benefits.  However,  the  new  contribution  formula  links  the 
replacement  rate  and  social  security  wealth  to  a  larger  set  of  risks,  including  aggregate  and 
demographic risks. This makes the new schemes potentially more risky than the old. 
In summary, there are many reasons to believe that pension reforms might have affected 
portfolio rules, but the direction of effects is a priori ambiguous, making the empirical analysis of 
the portfolio effect of pension reforms more interesting. 
  
3. Trends in financial and real wealth 
 
Since the effects of the reforms differ across cohort-employment groups, one might expect 
that the most affected groups also exhibit the largest financial and real wealth adjustment. To 
investigate this possibility, we normalize financial and real wealth by disposable income and 
compute the averages of financial and real wealth before and after the reforms for the old, the 
middle aged and the young for three employment groups (private and public employees and self-
employed). 
Table 3 shows that financial and real wealth increase after the reform. The increase is more 
pronounced for the middle-aged (in particular for middle-aged self-employed, which, according 
to  Table  2,  is  the  group  most  affected  by  the  reform),  but  non-negligible  for  old  private 
employees, a group which is relatively unaffected by the reform. Furthermore, changes in real 
wealth are larger than changes in financial wealth in absolute and relative terms. For middle-aged 
self-employed, financial wealth increases by a quarter of annual income in absolute terms, and by 
50% in relative terms; real wealth increases by more than 5 times annual income in absolute 
terms, and by 150% in relative terms.   9
In Table 3 one could compute the “difference-in-difference” among employment groups. 
Since old private employees are unaffected by the reform, the wealth difference after the reform 
for the middle-aged should be attributed to the reform. This would imply that the effect of the 
reform on financial wealth for middle-aged self-employed is 50 days of income, while the effect 
on real wealth is over 3 times annual income. For middle-aged public employees the effects are 
smaller,  close to zero for financial wealth and about 1 year’s income for real wealth. 
But  this back-of-the-envelope  calculation  does  not  provide  a  conclusive  answer  on  the 
effect of the reforms because it does not consider other variables that could induce shifts in the 
composition of employment groups after the reform. We know that stock market participation 
differs across education and income groups, and it would be useful to measure changes in wealth 
after the reform for a given education and income groups. Age affects portfolio decisions; for 
instance, after a pension reform individuals close to retirement might not increase stockholding at 
the same rate as the young. Macro shocks also shape household portfolios differently over time; 
examples include the stock market crash of the early 2000s and subsequent recovery, the decline 
of the yield on short-term government bonds after the introduction of the euro and the recent 
house price boom. 
To gain further insights on the portfolio effect of pension reforms, in the next section we 
explore the link between various components of private wealth and social security wealth in a 
regressions framework that exploits the exogenous variation in social security wealth brought 
about by the reforms.  
 
 
4. The portfolio effects of pension reforms 
 
As shown in Section 2, the Italian pension reforms of the last decade have reduced social 
security  wealth  for  most  households.  The  reduction  is  more  dramatic  for  the  young  and  the 
middle-aged, and among the self-employed. In Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2006) we show that 
this reduction prompted an increase in private wealth for those most affected by the reforms 
(middle-aged public employees and self-employed) and with better understanding of the new   10
pension regime. But finding an overall displacement effect between private wealth and social 
security wealth is only part of the story. Do households react to a pension reform increasing the 
liquid component of wealth? Do they take more or less risk after the reform? What about the 
demand for targeted retirement saving ? 
To answer these questions, we first analyze the offset between social security wealth and 
the two main components of private wealth, real and financial assets. We then consider different 
components  of  wealth,  and  sample  splits  defined  on  the  basis  of  households’  degree  of 
information about future benefits. Finally, we focus on ownership of stocks, mutual funds, real 
estate, business wealth, private pension plans and life insurance. 
 
4.1. The econometric model 
 
Our empirical specification relates the ratios of financial and real assets the ratio of social 
security wealth to disposable income and to a set of observable variables potentially affecting 
portfolio choice. More specifically, we denote the ratio of financial (real) wealth to income for 
household i at time t by 
*
it y  and adopt the following specification: 
 
it t it it it X SSWY y ε θ β δ + + + =
*  
 
where SSWYit is the ratio of expected social security wealth at retirement (evaluated at time t) to 
disposable income, Xit a vector that includes age of the household head, year and employment 
dummies,  a  dummy  for  middle  aged  and  the  interaction  with  employment  dummies,  and 
interactions  between  employment  dummies  and  a  post-reform  dummy,  region  and  education 
dummies and disposable income. Age, income, and education are proxies for lifetime earnings, 
while year dummies capture macroeconomic effects.
6 Regional dummies control for differences 
in wealth across Italian macro-regions, while employment dummies and their interactions control 
for group and time effects not due to the reform.
 Demographic variables refer to the head of the 
household, defined as the partner with higher earnings. To focus on the long-run effects of the 
                                                 
6 In the regressions, the reference group is private employees without a college degree and living in Northern Italy.   11
reforms, we omit the transitional period,  and estimate the model merging four surveys (1989-91 
and 2004-06). We limit the sample to people in their working age, dropping the 50+. Moreover, 
those who entered the labor market after 1995 (the young) cannot be used to evaluate the effect of 
the reform and are dropped from the analysis. 
The expected social security wealth-to-income ratio is adjusted by the factor suggested by 
Gale (1998). This factor considers the number of years people have contributed to the social 
security system as well as for when in their life cycle they have experienced the pension reform. 
The adjustment depends on the utility function that is chosen for the underlying life-cycle model 
and on the values for the discount rate, the interest rate and the time preference rate. We assume a 
utility function with constant relative risk aversion and set the discount and interest rates to 2 
percent (for details see Appendix). 
In the estimation we adopt an IV approach to deal with the potential endogeneity of social 
security wealth with respect to portfolio decisions. The endogeneity is due to unobserved factors 
which affect both productivity and portfolio decisions. For instance, if thrift and hard work are 
correlated tastes, people with these traits might choose to retire later with higher pension wealth 
and to invest in long-term saving instruments. We thus rely on the variability introduced by the 
reforms to construct a measure of statutory social security wealth as an instrument for expected 
social security wealth. Statutory wealth is correlated with expected pension wealth, but is not 
affected  by  individual  preferences  or  beliefs.  In  particular,  statutory  social  security  wealth 
depends on statutory retirement age  and legislated replacement rates, which change  after the 
reform according to employment and cohort groups. As discussed in Section 2, for old private 
employees statutory social security wealth was essentially unaffected by the reforms, while other 
groups (public employees, self-employed, the  young and the middle-aged) were affected and 
should have revised their expectations downward (as shown in the lower panel of Table 2). 
 
4.2. Wealth allocation 
 
The regressions in Table 4 show that a reduction in social security wealth equivalent to 1 
year’s income is associated with an increase in financial wealth of just below 1 month’s income. 
The  estimates  also  indicate  that  the  financial  wealth-income  ratio  falls  with  age  during  the   12
working lifetime (the sample does not include households over 50), is lower in the South, and 
increases  with  income  and  education;  the  coefficients  of  the  employment  dummies  are  not 
statistically different from zero. We then check if information about pension reforms prompts 
larger  wealth  adjustments.  Accordingly,  we  split  the  sample  on  the  basis  of  the  difference 
between statutory and expected social security wealth. We call “Informed” and “Uninformed” 
households for whom the difference (in absolute value) is, respectively, less or more than the 
median (just above 1). In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 we find that the offset coefficient is about 
twice as large for the “Informed” group.
 7  
The  other  columns  of  Table  4  refer  to  real  wealth.  The  displacement  coefficients  are 
negative  and  precisely  estimated  for  the  total  sample,  and  for  both  the  “Informed”  and  the 
“Uninformed” sub-samples. A reduction in social security wealth of 1 year’s income is associated 
with an increase in real assets of about 9 months of income for the “Informed” and just below 4 
months for the “Uninformed”. Overall, the evidence suggests that the effect of the reform is 
larger on real assets than on financial assets and for the “Informed” group.
8 
Table 5 breaks down financial wealth into “risky” and “safe” financial assets, and real 
wealth in real estate and business wealth. Risky financial assets include stocks held directly or 
indirectly  through  mutual  funds  and  other  investment  accounts;  safe  financial  assets  include 
corporate and government bonds and transaction accounts. In the first two columns of Table 5 the 
displacement coefficients are negative, statistically different from zero, but small in size. In line 
with previous studies, we also find that stockholding is positively correlated with income and 
education, and is lower in Central and Southern Italy (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli, 2003). 
The results in column 3 indicate that the displacement effect for safe financial assets (-
0.076) is stronger than for risky financial assets. The relation with income is again positive but 
not precisely estimated; safe assets increase with education and are lower in the Centre and in the 
South. Distinguishing further between corporate bonds, Treasury Bills, and transaction accounts 
reveals  that  the  demand  for  corporate  bonds  has  not  been  affected  by  the  pension  reforms. 
                                                 
7 We also add to the baseline specification the interaction between the information indicator and the social security 
wealth to income ratio, run the regression on the whole sample and find that the coefficient is statistically different 
from zero at the 10% confidence level for real wealth.   
8  We  also  estimate  the  elasticity  of  real  and  financial  wealth  with  respect to social  security  wealth.  They  are, 
respectively,  -0.802 (with a standard error of 0.056) and 0.237 (with a standard error of 0.036).    13
Instead, reducing social security wealth by 1 year’s income is associated with an increase in the 
demand for Treasury Bills of about 10 days of income (6 days for transaction accounts). For 
brevity, these results are not reported. 
The remaining columns of Table 5 refer to real estate and business wealth. The effect of 
social security wealth on real estate (-0.597) is negative and statistically different from zero, in 
line  with  the  predictions  of  the  life-cycle  framework.  Instead,  in  the  regression  for  business 
wealth the coefficient is positive (0.11) and statistically different from zero at the 10 percent 
level.  
To explore the effect of people’s awareness of pension reforms, in Table 6 we repeat the 
estimation distinguishing between “Informed” and “Uninformed” households. For brevity, we 
report only the displacement coefficients between social security wealth and the various wealth 
components. The table suggests that there are not large differences between the two groups for 
risky  assets  and  real  estate,  while  differences  are  larger  and  statistically  significant  for  safe 
financial assets (-0.120 for the informed and -0.046 for the uninformed). The results for business 
wealth show a statistically significant effect only for the uninformed (0.320). The effect for this 
group of households is hard to reconcile with the standard life-cycle model, where a reduction in 
pension wealth should be associated with an increase in private wealth.  
 
4.3. Asset ownership  
 
People can respond to pension reforms by adjusting wealth levels as well as by changing 
ownership of particular assets. The first column of Table 7 reports instrumental variable probit 
regressions for direct and indirect stock market participation, using the same specification as in 
Tables  5  and  6.  The  instrument  for  expected  social  security  wealth  is  again  statutory  social 
security wealth, imputed from legislation in 1989-91 and 2004-06. The results suggest that the 
probability of investing in stocks is negatively associated with social security wealth, but the 
marginal effect reported in the last row is small: -0.012 for total stockholding and -0.009 when 
only direct stockholding is considered. The positive effect of income and education on stock 
market participation is consistent with previous evidence (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli, 2003).   14
Ownership of safe financial assets is not related with social security wealth (column 3), 
because  a  vast  majority  of  households  has  transaction  accounts  before  and  after  the  pension 
reforms. The final two columns of Table 7 report probit regressions for the propensity to invest in 
real  estate  and  business wealth.  Both  variables  are  negatively  correlated  with  social  security 
wealth, and the marginal effect is higher in absolute value for real estate than for business wealth 
(-0.063 and -0.017 respectively). 
In  Table  8  we  again  split  the  sample  according  to  households’  information.  For 
stockholding the marginal effects of social security wealth are similar in the two groups: -0.011 
for total stockholding and -0.010 for direct stockholding in the informed group, and -0.018 and -
0.011,  respectively,  for  the  uninformed.
9  For  safe  financial  assets  the  marginal  effects  are 
negative for the “Informed” (-0.006) and positive (0.013) for the “Uninformed”. The effects on 
the propensity to invest in real estate are similar in the two groups (-0.069 for the Informed and -
0.072 for the Uninformed), while the effect on the propensity to invest in business wealth is 
larger in the Informed group. Overall, the results for asset ownership suggest that the response to 
pension  reforms  is  larger  for  real  assets,  and  that  differences  between  “Informed”  and 
“Uninformed” groups are relatively small. 
 
4.4. Life insurance and pension funds  
 
An analysis of the effect of pension reforms on the portfolio allocation of private wealth 
ideally should also consider saving targeted for retirement such as private pension plans and life 
insurance  policies.  Our  data  contains  only  information  on  ownership,  and  not on the  market 
value, of such products, which is the reason why we only deal with it at this stage of the analysis.  
In  the  last  two  decades,  pension  legislation  has  repeatedly  tried  to  encourage  the 
development of pension funds and life insurance in what appears to be an “infant industry” in 
Italy (Fornero, Borella, Fugazza and Ponzetto, 2002). Favored fiscal treatments of contributions 
to  life-insurance  policies  have  been  introduced  since  1986,  and  have  been  later  extended  to 
                                                 
9 As a further check, we also run an instrumental variable probit regression on the total sample and interact social 
security wealth with the information variable. The coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically different from 
zero.    15
contributions to pension funds.
10 Whether or not such measures have been effective is an open 
question,  though  the  evidence  presented  in  Jappelli  and  Pistaferri  (2003)  suggests  that  tax 
incentives have been ineffective at stimulating households’ propensity to invest in retirement 
saving instruments. Here, we address a related question, that is, whether the reduction in social 
security wealth brought about by the reforms has stimulated the propensity to invest in saving 
plans targeted for retirement. We therefore run instrumental variable probit regressions for the 
propensity to invest in pension plans and life-insurance maintaining the same specification as for 
ownership of other assets.  
The first three columns 1 to 3 of Table 9 focus on private pension plans. The regression 
coefficients indicate that the demand for private pension plans is higher among the self-employed 
and  in  Northern  Italy,  and  that  it  increases  with  income  and  education.  The  coefficient  and 
marginal effect of the ratio of social security wealth to disposable income are negative but not 
statistically  different  from  zero.  Splitting  the  sample  between  informed  and  uninformed 
households does not change the overall picture. 
The other columns of Table 9 refer to ownership of life-insurance.
11 The results are similar 
to those for pension plans: the association with social security wealth is negative, but the effect is 
small  and  not  statistically  different  from  zero;  the  effect  of  the  other  variables  (income, 
education, region of residence) is also similar. 
Overall, the results in Table 9 suggest that pension reforms have not been associated with 
an increase in households’ propensity to invest in assets targeted for retirement. This finding is in 
line with recent evidence. Cesari, Grandi and Panetta (2008) suggest that the low development of 
the third pillar in Italy is the consequence of high social security contribution rates. Bottazzi, 
Jappelli and Padula (2006) refer to lack of adequate financial education and lack of information 
on pension matters as a reason for the low saving response to pension reforms. Cesari, Grandi 
and Panetta (2008) point out that discontinuous careers and limited labor market participation 
also  account  for  the  low  take-up  rate  of  pension  funds  among  young  workers  and  women. 
                                                 
10 More recent policy interventions have been directed at diverting contributions to the severance payment fund (so-
called TFR) towards complementary pension products. Starting from January 2007 workers can choose to direct TFR 
contributions to complementary pension plans.  
11 Since we aim at capturing the demand for long-term saving, life insurance excludes term policies, where the 
premium is paid to the heirs only in case of death of the subscriber, as well as indexed and unit linked policies.   16
Finally,  due  to  the  high  cost  of  annuities,  most  Italian  households  consider  life  insurance 
contracts  as  a  financial  investment  rather  than  as  an  insurance  contract  to  protect  against 
longevity risk.
12 According to Guazzarotti and Tommasino (2008), the money’s worth ratio (the 
ratio between the present value of annuity payments and the premium paid to the insurer), is at 
most 84 percent for a private life insurance contract; in contrast, the ratio is much higher (around 
100 percent) for social security benefits.  
 
 
5. Summary and policy implications 
 
Pension  reforms  have  reduced  dramatically  social  security  wealth  of  certain  groups  of 
Italian households, and especially that of self-employed, public employees and workers with less 
than 15 years of contributions in 1995. In contrast, older workers have been insulated from the 
reform,.  The  aim  of  the  paper  is  to  exploit  changes  in  expected  social  security  wealth  on 
households’ portfolio allocations. In our exercise we use the Bank of Italy Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth, a large representative sample of the Italian population available from 1989 
to 2006, and construct expected social security wealth using individual subjective beliefs about 
social security benefits after retirement. But we also recognize the potential endogeneity of the 
constructed  measure  of  expected  social  security  wealth,  which  depends  on  observed  and 
unobserved  households’  characteristics.  Accordingly,  we  adopt  an  instrumental  variables 
approach,  using  an  instrument  social  security  wealth  computed  from  current  legislation.  The 
pension reform provides the variability in our constructed measures of expected and statutory 
social  security  wealth  that  allows  us  to  identify  the  effect  of  pension  reforms  of  household 
portfolios. 
Our  indicators  of  social  security  wealth  also  allow  us to  investigate how  the  portfolio 
response  to  the  pension  reform  depends  on  the  degree  of  uncertainty  about  social  security 
benefits. Our findings suggest that Italian households have responded to the reduction in pension 
                                                 
12 At the end of the accumulation phase, life insurance contracts give investors the option between an annuity and a 
lump  sum.  Data  from  the  National  Association  of  Insurance  Companies  (ANIA)  reported  by  Guazzarotti  and 
Tommasino (2008) indicate that in 2003-05 only 11,000 investors out of 1,940,00 opted for the annuity. 
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wealth brought about by the reform investing more in real assets and in safe financial assets. In 
particular, a reduction in social security wealth by the equivalent of 1 year’s income has been 
followed by an increase of 7 months’ income in real assets and an increase in safe financial assets 
of  1  month’s  income.  The  regression  estimates  uncover  other  interesting  results.  First,  the 
response is stronger among households that are able to estimate more accurately future social 
security benefits. Second, there is negligible effect on financial market participation after the 
reform. Third, despite the fact that pension reforms have reduced substantially pension wealth for 
a large fraction of workers, we do not observe an increase in the propensity to purchase private 
pension funds and life insurance after the reform. 
Since the increase in wealth after the reform is mostly due to an increase in real estate 
wealth, essentially substituting an annuity with assets which do not insure against longevity risk 
and that can only be liquidated at a cost, one wonders if after the reform households are preparing 
adequately for retirement. To see the issues involved, suppose that people wish to annuitize their 
housing wealth at retirement, which we take age 65. With risk-neutral lenders the fraction of 
consumable housing wealth depends on the expected growth of house prices and the interest rate. 
The larger the gap between the expected growth rate of house prices and the interest rate, the 
larger the amount of housing wealth that can be consumed. 
Under plausible assumptions, a 65-years-old male can consume at most 85 percent of his 
housing wealth, a similar fraction to what found by Sinai and Souleles (2008) with U.S. data in 
the  absence  of  credit  market  imperfections.
13  This  implies  that  total  amount  of  consumable 
wealth after retirement is at most 85 percent of real estate plus financial wealth.
14 On average, 
social security wealth for a middle-aged household falls by 45,000 euro after the reform (1.3 
years of disposable income). Since for the average household the real estate wealth-income ratio 
increases  by  0.78  and  financial  wealth  by  0.11,  the  overall  consumable  wealth-income  ratio 
increases by 0.77 (and the level of consumable wealth by 26,600 euro). But the actual increase in 
consumable real estate wealth is likely to be much lower, due to credit market imperfections and 
informational  asymmetries  in  the  reverse  mortgage  and  annuity  markets.  Sinai  and  Souleles 
estimate  that  in  the  presence  of  credit  market imperfections  U.S.  households could  consume 
                                                 
13 The typical mortgage rate in Italy is 4.6 percent (European Mortgage Federation, 2006); we set the expected 
nominal growth rate of house prices at 3.5 percent.   18
about 60 percent of real estate wealth during retirement. If one applies this more realistic value, 
the increase in the consumable wealth-income ratio after the reform shrinks to only 0.58 (and the 
level of consumable wealth to 20,000 euro). 
Our results have four main implications. First, though Italian households seem to be aware 
of the effect of pension reforms on replacement rates and social security wealth, there is still a 
considerable  gap  between  expectations  and  legislated  values  for  pension  benefits.  Improving 
information about pension benefits is therefore of paramount importance. A second implication is 
that since the offset between social security wealth and private wealth is considerably less then 
one-for-one even for informed households, increasing information is not be sufficient to induce 
households to increase their private wealth. 
The third implication has to do with the particular asset mix of Italian households, where 
real assets, and housing in particular, play a dominant role. Pension reforms have not diminished 
the propensity to invest in real estate. On the contrary, they have apparently induced additional 
demand for housing. Will people be able to use this additional wealth to supplement the fall in 
income after retirement? Our calculations above show that pension reforms have reduced social 
security wealth of middle-aged workers by about 45,000 euro, and that this reduction is likely to 
be offset by an increase of consumable private wealth of only 20,000 euro. This means that the 
response of private wealth to pension reforms is still limited, and that the adequacy of saving 
issue  will  be  an  important  concern  for  future  generations  of  retirees.  The  final,  and  related 
implication is that despite a decade of intense legislative  efforts, a negligible fraction of the 
increase in private wealth has been channeled in private pension plans. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
14 In the calculation we exclude business wealth from the definition of consumable wealth.   19
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Appendix 
1. The construction of social security wealth 
  
We calculate the ratio of expected social security wealth (at retirement) to earnings (evaluated at 
time t) in a way that keeps the computation as simple as possible while being tailored to the 
inclusion of elicited expectations of the replacement rate and the retirement age. To do this, we 
use the following proxy for each worker’s expected social security wealth-to-income ratio: 
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where σt is the expected replacement rate and Nt the expected retirement age elicited at time t,
15 T 
the maximum length of life, p(τ|N) the probability of surviving to age τ, conditional on being 
alive at age N, gu the growth rate of earnings for group u, r the real interest rate, and gN the 
growth rate of pension benefits during retirement – assumed to be the same for all groups. 
 
In the survey we observe σt and Nt for each individual. In the empirical estimates we check the 
sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumption of point expectations for Nt, allowing for 
some dispersion around the reported expected retirement age. Survival probabilities are taken 
from the Italian life tables, by age and gender, for the years 1990 and 2000, so that the change in 
life expectancy over time, and in particular before and after the reform, is accounted for.
16 The 
growth rate of earnings (gu) is estimated from our data at 0.015 for individuals with university 
degree  and  at  0.008  for individuals  with less  than university  degree.
17  We  assume  that  after 
retirement pensions are constant in real terms (gN=0) and that the real interest rate is equal to 2 
percent. 
 
2. The adjustment factor for expected social security wealth 
 
As in Gale (1998), we adjust pension wealth multiplying each individual’s expected pension 
wealth by a factor that takes into account people’s position in the life cycle and years of service 
in the pension as well as the position in people’s life cycle when a change in pension benefits 
takes place (the reforms, in our case). The underlying idea for the simplest theoretical model is 
that people plan their consumption at the beginning of their working career, and consumption is a 
function of total lifetime resources, that is earnings and pension benefits. Since decisions are 
based on total lifetime resources, the true offset between pension wealth and private wealth is 100 
percent (coefficient of -1). However, as pointed out by Gale (1998, pp. 708-710) an estimate of 
the coefficient of pension wealth in a regression of private wealth on earnings to date, lifetime 
                                                 
15 t is equal to 1989, 1991, 2004, 2006, the survey years in which the expected replacement rate is elicited. 
16 Data source: Italian Statistical Annex (Rome: ISTAT, 1990 and 2000). 
17 The growth rates were obtained from a median regression of log-earnings on sex and employment dummies and 
full interaction of age with a college dummy. Data source: SHIW, years 1989-2006, individuals aged 20-60.   22
earnings and pension benefits, would not produce the true offset. The pension wealth coefficient 
would instead be between –1 and 0, and a function of the years of service in the pension and of 
the expected life horizon. In particular, in the case of a CRRA utility function, the coefficient 
would be as follows: 
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= − , and r =interest rate, δ =time preference rate,  ρ =coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, S =years of service in the pension, T =life span, and le =life expectancy. 
 
Therefore, one would need to adjust pension wealth by this factor in order to recover the true 
offset in the regression. Intuitively, this factor adjusts pension wealth to account for the fact that a 
change in pension wealth that takes place at the beginning of one’s career translates into a change 
in the consumption plan (and therefore in non-pension wealth) over the life span. At time S, the 
reduction in non-pension wealth is captured by Q, and Q increases with S to reflect the fact that 
the later in life we observe individual’s decisions, the more of the initial plan has already taken 
place. 
  
A further aspect to be taken into account is given by the time at which the change in pension 
benefit is realized. For a generic time t*, Gale’s adjustment factor is: 
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This accounts for the fact that individuals had to revise their plans at time t* and the remaining 
horizon over which they can realize their plans is shorter. 
 
In our setting, we assume that r =δ = 0.02 and apply different adjustment factors according to 
which group the individual belongs to. In particular, the so-called “Old” group is not affected by 
the reform, and therefore we apply a version of Q, corrected for the fact that individuals start 
contributing to the pension system at different ages (we observe this in the data), i.e.: 
 
exp[ ( ) 1]
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r age agew
G
r le age agew
− − −
=
− + − −
 
 
where age = age at which observed and agew = age at which started working.
18 The adjustment 
factor for the group affected by the reform (“Middle-aged”) instead needs to take into account of 
the year in which the reform took place and is therefore a version of Q*. We assume that the year 
of the reform is 1995 and adjust pension wealth of individuals belonging to this  group, and 
observed after the reform, by the following factor: 
                                                 
18 We use the Italian life tables by age and gender to recover le (life expectancy).   23
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where ageref = age at which the individual faced the reform. 
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Figure 1 















Note. The figure plots the absolute value of the expectation error in the pre-reform (1989-91) and post-reform (2004-
06) regimes. The expectation error is defined as the difference between the expected and the statutory social security 
wealth-income ratio. 
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Table 1 
Retirement age and pension award formula before and after the pension reforms 
 
  Retirement age 
 
Old age pensions  Seniority pensions 
Minimum retirement age  Minimum years 
of contributions 
Minimum years of contributions 























rising to 65(60) 
65(60)  65(60)  Progressively 
rising to 20 
40 before age 57 
35 after age 57 
40 before 
age 58; 






rising to 65(60) 
65(60)  65(60)  Progressively 
rising to 20 
40 before age 57 
35 after age 57 
40 before 
age 58; 
35 after age 
58 
Young  Subject to incentives: 57-65 
 




Pension award formula 
 








2%  ×  years  of 
contributions  ×  average 
of  the  last  5  years  of 
earnings 
 
2.33%  ×  years  of 
contribution × last  year of 
earnings 
2%  ×  years  of 
contributions  × 
times average of the 












Gradually to 2% × years 
of  contribution  × 
average of last 10 years 
of earnings 
Gradually to 2% × years of 
contribution  ×  average  of 
last 10 years of earnings 
Gradually  to  2%  × 
years of contribution 
× average of last 15 
years of earnings 
 
Middle-aged 
Pro rata model 
 
 





Contributions  (33%  of  gross  wage  for  employees  and  20%  for  self-
employed) are capitalized on the basis of 5-years moving average of GDP 
growth. The capitalized sum is then multiplied by a coefficient that varies by 
retirement age, taking into account life expectancy. 
 
 
Note. Old, middle-aged and young refer, respectively, to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 1995, 
less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, and who start working after 1995. In the top panel female retirement age 
is reported in parenthesis when different from males. 
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 Table 2 
Expected and statutory social security wealth before and after the pension reforms 
 
Expected social security wealth  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Change after the reform 
Private employees       
Old  10.67  8.89  -1.78 
Middle-aged  8.30  6.92  -1.38 
Young    5.46   
Public employees       
Old  10.75  10.09  -0.66 
Middle-aged  9.16  7.97  -1.19 
Young    6.17   
Self-employed       
Old   7.58  6.42  -1.16 
Middle-aged  7.00  5.62  -1.38 
Young    5.04   
       
Statutory social security wealth       
Private employees       
Old  9.36  9.05  -0.30 
Middle-aged  7.37  7.06  -0.30 
Young    5.81   
Public employees       
Old  10.87  10.32  -0.55 
Middle-aged  9.03  7.58  -1.45 
Young    6.10   
Self-employed       
Old   7.69  7.91  0.22 
Middle-aged  6.57  4.97  -1.60 
Young    3.62   
 
Note. The statutory social security wealth, normalized by (annual) disposable income, is computed on the basis of 
legislation and a given retirement age. Both the expected and statutory replacement rates refer to male workers. The 
pre-reform and post-reforms periods are, respectively, 1989-1991, and 2004-2006. Old, middle-aged and  young 
refer, respectively, to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 1995, less than 18 years of contributions in 
1995, and who start working after 1995.   27
Table 3 
Financial and real wealth before and after the pension reforms 
 
Financial wealth  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Change after the reform  
 
Private employees       
Old  0.50  0.62  0.12 
Middle-aged  0.42  0.46  0.04 
Young       0.39   
Public employees       
Old  0.49  0.54  0.05 
Middle-aged  0.41  0.54  0.13 
Young       0.40   
Self-employed       
Old   0.61  0.70  0.09 
Middle-aged  0.49  0.74  0.25 
Young    0.55   
       
Real wealth       
Private employees       
Old  2.70  4.71  2.01 
Middle-aged  1.80  4.32  2.53 
Young        2.95   
Public employees       
Old  3.15  5.50  2.35 
Middle-aged  2.30  5.36  3.05 
Young        4.02   
Self-employed       
Old   5.03  9.36  4.33 
Middle-aged  3.64  9.22  5.58 
Young    6.51   
 
Note. Financial and real wealth are divided by annual disposable income. The pre-reform and post-reforms periods 
are, respectively, 1989-1991, and 2004-2006. Old, middle-aged and young refer, respectively, to workers with more 




Displacement effect for financial and real wealth - IV estimates. 
 
  Financial wealth / Disposable income 
 
Real wealth / Disposable income 






Informed   Uninfor-
med 
 
SSW/Disposable Income  -0.082  -0.128  -0.055  -0.478  -0.761  -0.318 
  (0.011)***  (0.019)***  (0.013)***  (0.070)***  (0.080)***  (0.131)* 
Year 1991  -0.044  -0.008  -0.079  0.902  1.039  0.778 
  (0.033)  (0.054)  (0.036)*  (0.207)***  (0.223)***  (0.353)* 
Year 2004  -0.119  -0.082  -0.131  1.552  1.898  1.329 
  (0.051)*  (0.083)  (0.058)*  (0.324)***  (0.344)***  (0.574)* 
Year 2006  -0.108  -0.040  -0.155  1.950  2.297  1.725 
  (0.054)*  (0.088)  (0.060)**  (0.341)***  (0.368)***  (0.594)** 
Age  0.014  0.020  0.007  0.107  0.115  0.103 
  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.003)*  (0.016)***  (0.018)***  (0.029)*** 
Public employee  -0.059  -0.005  -0.098  0.056  0.168  0.109 
  (0.041)  (0.066)  (0.045)*  (0.257)  (0.276)  (0.447) 
Self-employed  -0.037  0.006  -0.064  1.569  1.661  1.562 
  (0.053)  (0.084)  (0.061)  (0.333)***  (0.348)***  (0.598)** 
Middle-aged  -0.159  -0.168  -0.163  -0.755  -1.132  -0.455 
  (0.051)**  (0.083)*  (0.059)**  (0.326)*  (0.347)**  (0.581) 
Public employee, middle-aged  0.042  -0.016  0.089  -0.016  -0.284  0.173 
  (0.062)  (0.100)  (0.070)  (0.394)  (0.419)  (0.690) 
Self-employed, middle-aged  0.099  0.130  0.061  -0.125  0.124  -0.443 
  (0.076)  (0.126)  (0.083)  (0.480)  (0.523)  (0.820) 
Public employee, after the reform  0.040  -0.033  0.105  0.474  0.551  0.252 
  (0.062)  (0.101)  (0.068)  (0.392)  (0.420)  (0.676) 
Self-employed, after the reform  0.117  -0.012  0.221  2.849  1.984  3.490 
  (0.074)  (0.124)  (0.080)**  (0.468)***  (0.518)***  (0.787)*** 
Central Italy  -0.149  -0.257  -0.037  0.911  0.544  1.276 
  (0.030)***  (0.050)***  (0.033)  (0.192)***  (0.208)**  (0.327)*** 
Southern Italy  -0.267  -0.314  -0.212  0.072  0.070  0.111 
  (0.026)***  (0.044)***  (0.028)***  (0.165)  (0.182)  (0.276) 
Income  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.004  -0.002  0.010 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)  (0.001)***  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
High-school degree  0.177  0.251  0.095  0.997  1.247  0.737 
  (0.025)***  (0.041)***  (0.027)***  (0.156)***  (0.172)***  (0.263)** 
College degree  0.255  0.351  0.166  1.684  2.024  1.360 
  (0.039)***  (0.067)***  (0.042)***  (0.249)***  (0.280)***  (0.411)*** 
Constant  0.273  0.141  0.438  -1.059  -0.610  -1.532 
  (0.109)*  (0.182)  (0.117)***  (0.687)  (0.757)  (1.152) 
             
Observation  9,123  4,598  4,525  9,123  4,598  4,525 
 
Note. All regressions are estimated by IV; the instrument is statutory social security wealth. Data are drawn from 
1989-91 and 2004-06 SHIW.. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Three stars indicate statistical significance 
at 0.1% confidence level; two stars at the 1%; one star at the 5% level.   29
Table 5 
Displacement effect for financial and real wealth components - IV estimates. 
 












Real estate  Business wealth 
SSW/Disposable Income  -0.006  -0.005  -0.076  -0.597  0.118 
  (0.003)*  (0.002)*  (0.011)***  (0.044)***  (0.052)* 
Year 1991  0.018  0.018  -0.062  0.764  0.087 
  (0.009)*  (0.006)**  (0.031)*  (0.131)***  (0.153) 
Year 2004  0.042  0.017  -0.161  1.365  0.163 
  (0.014)**  (0.010)  (0.048)***  (0.205)***  (0.239) 
Year 2006  0.059  0.023  -0.167  1.712  0.257 
  (0.015)***  (0.010)*  (0.051)**  (0.216)***  (0.252) 
Age   0.001  0.000  0.013  0.115  -0.009 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.002)***  (0.010)***  (0.012) 
Public employee  -0.016  -0.014  -0.043  -0.009  0.049 
  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.038)  (0.163)  (0.190) 
Self-employed  0.031  0.027  -0.068  -0.005  1.561 
  (0.014)*  (0.010)**  (0.050)  (0.211)  (0.246)*** 
Middle-aged  -0.027  -0.021  -0.133  -0.905  0.133 
  (0.014)  (0.010)*  (0.049)**  (0.206)***  (0.241) 
Public employee, middle-aged  -0.005  0.002  0.047  0.088  -0.098 
  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.059)  (0.249)  (0.291) 
Self-employed, middle-aged  0.021  0.010  0.078  -0.162  0.020 
  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.072)  (0.304)  (0.354) 
Public employee, after the reform  0.021  0.015  0.019  0.439  0.042 
  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.059)  (0.248)  (0.289) 
Self-employed, after the reform  -0.008  -0.023  0.125  1.191  1.639 
  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.070)  (0.296)***  (0.346)*** 
Central Italy  -0.038  -0.023  -0.111  0.787  0.121 
  (0.008)***  (0.006)***  (0.029)***  (0.121)***  (0.142) 
Southern Italy  -0.055  -0.021  -0.212  0.184  -0.126 
  (0.007)***  (0.005)***  (0.025)***  (0.104)  (0.122) 
Income  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
High-school degree  0.040  0.017  0.136  0.971  -0.015 
  (0.007)***  (0.005)***  (0.023)***  (0.099)***  (0.115) 
College degree  0.041  0.023  0.215  1.122  0.518 
  (0.011)***  (0.007)**  (0.037)***  (0.158)***  (0.184)** 
Constant  -0.016  0.011  0.289  -0.906  -0.201 
  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.103)**  (0.435)*  (0.507) 
 
Note. All regressions are estimated by IV; the instrument is statutory social security wealth. Data are drawn from 
1989-91 and 2004-06 SHIW (9,123 observations). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Three stars indicate 
statistical significance at 0.1% confidence level; two stars at the 1%; one star at the 5% level.    30
Table 6 
Displacement effect for financial and real wealth components - IV estimates. 
Sample splits for Informed and Uniformed households 
 
Dependent variable  Coefficient of  SSW / Disposable Income 
 
  Informed 
 
Uninformed 
Risky financial assets  
(including mutual funds) 
-0.007  -0.009 
(0.005)  (0.004)* 
     
Risky financial assets  
(excluding mutual funds) 
-0.007  -0.005 
(0.003)*  (0.003) 
     
Safe financial assets  -0.120  -0.046 
(0.018)***  (0.012)*** 
     
Real estate  -0.676  -0.637 
(0.064)***  (0.071)*** 
     
Business wealth  -0.086  0.320 
(0.045)  (0.105)** 
 
Note. The “Informed” group includes household where the expectation error in social security wealth is less than the 
median. The “Uninformed” group includes those for which the expectation error is greater then the median. Each 
regression also includes time effects, age, and dummies for employment, cohort, interactions of employment cohort 
and post-reform, area of residence, income and education. All regressions are estimated by IV; the instrument is 
statutory social security wealth. Data are drawn from 1989-91 and 2004-06 SHIW (4,598 in the Informed group and  
4,525  observations  in  the  Uninformed  group).  Standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis.  Three  stars  indicate 
statistical significance at 0.1% confidence level; two stars at the 1%; one star at the 5% level. 
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Table 7 
Ownership of financial and real assets - IV Probit estimates.   
 









Real estate  Business 
wealth 
SSW/Disposable Income  -0.081  -0.096  0.017  -0.178  -0.084 
  (0.020)***  (0.023)***  (0.018)  (0.015)***  (0.019)*** 
Year 1991  -0.009  -0.022  0.439  0.257  -0.031 
  (0.062)  (0.069)  (0.049)***  (0.041)***  (0.059) 
Year 2004  0.382  0.126  0.480  0.272  -0.023 
  (0.091)***  (0.104)  (0.078)***  (0.066)***  (0.103) 
Year 2006  0.491  0.201  0.517  0.297  -0.079 
  (0.095)***  (0.108)  (0.083)***  (0.070)***  (0.108) 
Age   0.024  0.026  -0.004  0.034  0.004 
  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  (0.004)  (0.003)***  (0.005) 
Public employee  -0.021  -0.189  0.125  0.024  0.128 
  (0.076)  (0.086)*  (0.061)*  (0.052)  (0.080) 
Self-employed  0.247  0.271  -0.044  -0.052  2.072 
  (0.091)**  (0.098)**  (0.076)  (0.069)  (0.081)*** 
Middle-aged  -0.262  -0.279  -0.054  -0.431  -0.207 
  (0.089)**  (0.103)**  (0.080)  (0.066)***  (0.104)* 
Public employee, middle-aged  0.112  0.108  0.092  0.150  0.035 
  (0.112)  (0.132)  (0.098)  (0.080)  (0.124) 
Self-employed, middle-aged  0.398  0.349  0.189  0.034  0.019 
  (0.126)**  (0.142)*  (0.115)  (0.102)  (0.124) 
Public employee, after the reform  -0.220  -0.030  0.005  0.007  0.179 
  (0.114)  (0.133)  (0.099)  (0.080)  (0.124) 
Self-employed, after the reform  -0.613  -0.632  -0.024  0.148  0.745 
  (0.125)***  (0.139)***  (0.114)  (0.099)  (0.121)*** 
Central Italy  -0.236  -0.256  -0.325  0.278  -0.030 
  (0.048)***  (0.058)***  (0.050)***  (0.040)***  (0.056) 
Southern Italy  -0.659  -0.508  -0.706  0.220  0.053 
  (0.050)***  (0.057)***  (0.040)***  (0.034)***  (0.048) 
Income  0.008  0.007  0.010  0.030  0.013 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
High-school degree  0.585  0.667  0.273  0.176  -0.036 
  (0.044)***  (0.054)***  (0.039)***  (0.032)***  (0.046) 
College degree  0.761  0.816  0.166  0.081  -0.208 
  (0.061)***  (0.071)***  (0.064)**  (0.055)  (0.072)** 
Constant  -2.548  -2.774  0.777  -1.603  -1.914 
  (0.191)***  (0.222)***  (0.168)***  (0.141)***  (0.200)*** 
           
Marginal effect of   -0.012  -0.009  0.003  -0.063  -0.017 
SSW/Disposable Income  (0.003)***  (0.0022)***  (0.003)  (0.005)***  (0.004)*** 
 
Note. All probit regressions are estimated by IV; the instrument is statutory social security wealth. Data are drawn 
from 1989-91 and 2004-06 SHIW (9,123 observations). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Three stars 
indicate statistical significance at 0.1% confidence level; two stars at the 1%; one star at the 5% level. The bottom 
two rows report marginal effects of the Social Security Wealth to disposable income ratio and the standard error. 
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Table 8 
Ownership of financial assets (IV Probit estimates). 
Sample splits for Informed and Uniformed households. 
 
 
Dependent variable  Marginal effects and standard errors of  SSW/Disposable Income 
 
  Informed  Uninformed 
Risky financial assets  
(including mutual funds) 
-0.011  -0.018 
(0.004)***  (0.005)*** 
     
Risky financial assets  
(excluding mutual funds) 
-0.010  -0.011 
(0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
     
Safe financial assets  -0.006  0.013 
(0.005)***  (0.006)* 
     
Real estate  -0.069  -0.072 
(0.007)***  (0.009)*** 
     
Business wealth  -0.033  -0.008 
(0.006)***  (0.005)*** 
 
Note. The “Informed” group includes household where the expectation error in social security wealth is less than the 
median. The “Uninformed” group includes those for which the expectation error is greater then the median. Each 
regression also includes time effects, age, and dummies for employment, cohort, interactions of employment cohort 
and post-reform, area of residence, income and education. All models are estimated by IV; the instrument is statutory 
social security wealth. Data are drawn from 1989-91 and 2004-06 SHIW 4,598 in the Informed group and  4,525 
observations in the Uninformed group). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Three stars indicate statistical 
significance at 0.1% confidence level; two stars at the 1%; one star at the 5% level. 
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Table 9 
Ownership of pension plans and life-insurance – IV probit estimates. 
 
  Pension plans 
 
Life-insurance policies 






Informed   Uninforme
d 
SSW/Disposable Income  -0.007  -0.012  0.001  -0.017  -0.020  -0.022 
  (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.025) 
Year 1991  -0.039  0.073  -0.165  0.218  0.204  0.243 
  (0.057)  (0.079)  (0.085)  (0.043)***  (0.059)***  (0.063)*** 
Year 2004  0.368  0.408  0.345  -0.061  0.012  -0.114 
  (0.084)***  (0.116)***  (0.125)**  (0.070)  (0.095)  (0.106) 
Year 2006  0.333  0.443  0.241  0.003  0.062  -0.043 
  (0.088)***  (0.123)***  (0.129)  (0.073)  (0.101)  (0.109) 
Age  0.005  0.002  0.007  -0.002  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Public employee  -0.050  -0.056  -0.039  -0.028  0.086  -0.153 
  (0.072)  (0.098)  (0.109)  (0.054)  (0.074)  (0.081) 
Self-employed  0.357  0.367  0.365  0.310  0.403  0.204 
  (0.085)***  (0.113)**  (0.129)**  (0.067)***  (0.089)***  (0.104)* 
Middle-aged  -0.044  -0.086  0.006  -0.074  -0.014  -0.156 
  (0.083)  (0.113)  (0.128)  (0.070)  (0.095)  (0.106) 
Public employee, middle-aged  -0.067  -0.117  -0.019  -0.039  -0.060  -0.012 
  (0.106)  (0.144)  (0.158)  (0.085)  (0.114)  (0.128) 
Self-employed, middle-aged  0.178  0.138  0.226  0.076  -0.116  0.293 
  (0.118)  (0.163)  (0.172)  (0.097)  (0.135)  (0.143)* 
Public employee, after the reform  -0.041  -0.032  -0.052  0.078  -0.066  0.236 
  (0.106)  (0.146)  (0.155)  (0.084)  (0.115)  (0.126) 
Self-employed, after the reform  -0.448  -0.408  -0.509  0.014  0.020  -0.024 
  (0.115)***  (0.163)*  (0.163)**  (0.095)  (0.134)  (0.136) 
Central Italy  -0.112  -0.039  -0.190  0.031  0.046  0.014 
  (0.045)*  (0.062)  (0.066)**  (0.040)  (0.055)  (0.057) 
Southern Italy  -0.599  -0.573  -0.627  -0.104  -0.029  -0.177 
  (0.047)***  (0.068)***  (0.066)***  (0.035)**  (0.049)  (0.051)*** 
Income  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.007  0.006  0.008 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
High-school degree  0.313  0.345  0.280  0.224  0.267  0.170 
  (0.040)***  (0.057)***  (0.057)***  (0.033)***  (0.046)***  (0.048)*** 
College degree  0.479  0.593  0.367  0.288  0.347  0.215 
  (0.059)***  (0.085)***  (0.083)***  (0.051)***  (0.072)***  (0.072)** 
Constant  -1.718  -1.721  -1.749  -1.030  -1.173  -0.882 
  (0.177)***  (0.250)***  (0.255)***  (0.145)***  (0.204)***  (0.209)*** 
             
Marginal effect of the   -0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006 
SSW/Disposable Income  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Observations  9,120  4,597  4,523  9,104  4,586  4,518 
Note. The “Informed” group includes household where the expectation error in social security wealth is less than the 
median. The “Uninformed” group includes those for which the expectation error is greater then the median. All 
probit regressions are estimated by IV; the instrument is statutory social security wealth. Data are drawn from 1989-
91 and 2004-06 SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Three stars indicate statistical significance at 
0.1% confidence level; two stars at the 1%; one star at the 5% level. The marginal effects of the Social Security 
Wealth to disposable income ratio and the standard error is reported in the third and second row from the bottom. 